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1 Introduction
Donors have begun increasingly to encourage their
field partners in recent years, to attain financial sus-
tainability in the provision of financial services (FS)
and thereby phase out the need for a continual
grant (Jackelen and Rhyne 1991; Yaron 1992;
Bennett and Cuevas 1996; Dichter 1996). The
attraction of sustainability to a donor is not difficult
to understand, particularly as it can easily be mea-
sured (Johnson and Rogaly 1997) by the Subsidy
Dependence Index (SDO' developed by Yaron
(1992). Higher values of SDI effectively imply
'unsustainability' of the FS while zero or negative
values of the SDI suggest that the FS is 'sustain-
able'.
Nevertheless, FS institutions generally have a bad
record of achieving sustainability (Yaron, 1992;
Rhyne and Otero 1994), perhaps in part because
non-government organisations (NGOs), a major
player in FS provision, may not have adequate
personnel or institutional structures to manage PS
schemes effectively (Johnson and Rogaly 1997). As
a result, it has been argued that the donors behind
NGOs take a more active role in management
rather than their more traditional passive role of
providing the cash and letting the NGO get on with
implementation (Schmidt and Zeitinger 1996).
While donors can be considered as having a moral
right to such an involvement, there is a danger that
they may begin to make decisions without the nec-
essary experience and knowledge of the local situ-
ation, and with unreasonable time scales (Hulme
and Mosley 1996).
Some have also questioned the drive towards sus-
tainability on the part of the donors (Dichter 1996;
Brown 1997). This criticism is based on a number
of arguments. To begin with, sustainability may
result in an understandable tendency to focus on
those best able to repay loans, rather than those in
need. Secondly an emphasis on sustainability may
drive the field partner to focus on FS provision and
nothing else (Mutua 1994; Berenbach and Guzman
1994; Dichter 1996). Indeed as the number of
loans issued, number of savings accounts held,
amounts saved, loan repayment rates etc. are all
easily quantifiable, they can act as strict 'indicators'
The higher the SDI, the more the interest rate needs to
he increased to make the FS institution self-sufficient.
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Table 1: The Number of Borrowers and Percentage of Population' Serviced by five NGOs
involved in Rural Finance Services. Data for BAAC, BKK, BUD and GB taken from Yaron
(1992)
* assumes an Igala population of 1000,000
of performance for use by donors and others
(Tendler 1989).
This article discusses some of these aspects of FS
sustainability with a case study of the Diocesan
Development Services (DDS) - a Catholic Mission
based NGO in Kogi State, Nigeria. The DDS FS
scheme is not large relative to other well-known PS
projects (Table 1) or even formal Nigerian initia-
tives such as the Peoples Bank (Tiamiyu 1994;
Soyibo 1996). However, the DDS experience pro-
vides some useful lessons for a number of reasons.
First, DDS has considerable experience of operating
an FS scheme since the early 1970s. Second, pres-
sure from donors on DDS to quickly achieve sus-
tainability occurred when the social, economic and
political circumstances in Nigeria were undergoing
a rapid change with the introduction of structural
adjustment policies (SAP). Third, DDS was an inte-
gral part of a World Bank project from 1978 to
1983. After the gradual demise of the World Bank
project DDS re-started its life as an NGO. The FS
scheme also went through this 'transition', with
many important outcomes.
There are two specific questions that will be
addressed in this article:
(1) Is the goal of PS sustainability realistic for DDS,
given its involvement in other activities such as on-
farm research, primary health care, nutrition and
water supply?
A fuller account of the arguments presented in this article can be found in McNamara and Morse (1998).
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(2) What should be the relationship with donors
and to what extent should donors be encouraged to
influence decisions at the grassroots' level?
The article will first briefly highlight the back-
ground within which DDS has had to operate since
its birth in the early 1970s. This will be followed by
a brief history of the DDS FS project with a partic-
ular focus on its sustainability and how this has
changed. Finally the article will address questions
(1) and (2) above within the context of the history
of DDS and Nigeria.2
2 The Backdrop
Nigeria is by far the most populous sub-Saharan
country and is, in addition, relatively rich with an
economy dominated by oil. The oil price boom in
the 1970s and early 1980s kept the value of the
local currency (the naira) high, and helped to
increase imports and reduce exports of other non-
oil based commodities, Total reliance on oil meant
that when oil prices crashed in the early to mid-
1980s the Nigerian economy collapsed and as a
result structural adjustment programmes (SAPs)
were introduced in 1986. The devaluation of the
Naira was an essential requirement of SAP and, as a
result, imports became very expensive and inflation
increased by a factor of 7 to 8 between 1990 and
the mid-1990s. Nigeria therefore provides the epit-
ome of a boombust economy in the relatively short
space of just 20 years, and this economic history is
intertwined with a tortured history of civil war
Organisation Country and year Number of
borrowers
% of population
serviced
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives Thailand 2,600,000 52 (of farming pop.)
(MAC)
Badan Kredit Kacamatan (BKK) Indonesia 510,000 1.8
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Gesa (BUD) Indonesia (1989) 1,600,000 not available
Grameen Bank (GB) Bangladesh (1990) 660,000 17.2 (of target pop.)
Diocesan Development Services (DDS) Nigeria (1996) 30,000 3.0 (of Igala pop.*)
(1967-70), democracy, coups, failed coups and
associated administrative upheaval and change.
Quite clearly all development initiatives in Nigeria
can hardly be said to have existed within a stable
socio-economo-political context, and DDS is cer-
tainly no different in this regard.
The Igala
DDS is the 'development' arm of the Catholic
Diocese of Idah, and operates within an area coex-
tensive with the kingdom known as Igalaland
(4,900 square miles or approximately 1.5 per cent
of Nigeria's land area). The population is approxi-
mately one million, and the predominant ethnic
group is the Igala. The chief source of livelihood in
Igalaland is agriculture and, apart from small-scale
coal mining and a few timber companies, there is
no industry although the nearby steel industry in
Ajaokuta employs some Igalas. Farmers are often
involved in a number of 'off-farm' activities such as
fishing, milling, maintenance and repair services,
carpentry, tailoring, and trading. Conversely many
people in employment, eg civil servants, may
engage in farming in their spare time to supplement
their earnings.
In common with Nigeria as a whole (Eboh 1995;
Soyibo 1996), there are a number of indigenous
self-help organisations in Igalaland operating at vil-
lage level. The oja is one such organisation and can
be described as the traditional weekly meeting of a
community group on an entirely voluntary basis.
Each member of the oja makes a standard weekly
contribution which is equal for all members.
Members in turn receive an amount equal to the
sum of all the savings for a week, less the cost of the
entertainment and refreshments for the group for
that day Various other community responsibilities
are discussed at oja meetings, and it therefore plays
a central role in regulating village life.
Diocesan development services
DDS began its life in 1970 just after the Nigerian
Civil War which ravaged much of the south-east of
the country Igalaland, being on the front line for
much of the war, also suffered. Between 1970 and
1971 extensive dialogue between diocesan person-
nel and people from various villages suggested that
the development of agriculture was a priority in
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that this activity provided the funds for many other
desired developments such as the provision of
water. In particular many Igala people called for
help with finance as a central prerequisite for an
improvement in agriculture, and suggested that
DDS help with the modification of the existing oja
system to incorporate an emphasis on agricultural
finance. The result was the creation in 1972 of a
savings scheme based on Farmer Councils (FCs).
The FCs mirrored the oja system (Figures la and
lb) with weekly collections, but these funds were
lodged in a local bank and at the start of the grow-
ing season the money was withdrawn for invest-
ment in agriculture. An FC typically comprised a
group of ten people, and a group of FCs from a vil-
lage or a collection of FCs from neighbouring vil-
lages were called a 'zone'. Like the FCs, each zone
elected a chairperson, secretary treasurer and other
functionaries.
While the introduction of a savings scheme helped,
it quickly became clear that the sum saved needed
to be supplemented with credit and this would
require external funding. Obtaining an external
input was not a problem, as the Catholic Secretariat
of Nigeria (CSN)3 had a fund available for such ini-
tiatives. A decision was made by DDS and senior
members to charge interest at the rate of one kobo
per month on every naira borrowed (equivalent to
an annual interest rate of 12 per cent as one flaira
equals 100 kobos), and loans were to be double the
amount saved by the FC. Loan contract forms were
designed giving legal status to the agreement being
entered upon by the FC and DDS, and if the loan
was not fully repaid before the next planting season,
a further loan would not be forthcoming. These
operational matters were clear enough, but the
major concern of DDS and the FC membership at
the time was with self-reliance. While the emphasis
was on savings, the programme needed no external
input and therefore was entirely sustainable.
However, a decision to augment savings by a loan,
even if on a revolving basis, would require a depar-
ture from self-reliance. To help ameliorate this, it
was decided after consultation with senior members
that farmers in the FC project would be charged a
local contribution as well as a small fee to purchase
the loan form. Also, as they would be the people
responsible for seeing that repayments were made
An institution which provides help and facilities for all the Catholic diocese in Nigeria.
Figure la: The Structure of an Oja Group employed by the Igala in Traditional Meetings
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Figure lb: The Structure of a Farmer Council (FC) Group. The structure is based on that
of the Oja.
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within a year the zonal and FC chairmen began to
look very seriously at group membership. However,
distribution of the money between members was
and still is, the PC's responsibility
Up to the mid-1970s the DDS savings/credit
scheme expanded rapidly. Although it was clear that
people were initially drawn to the scheme because
of the loan facility rather than savings, all were
adamant that the saving component would be
maintained as the focal point of social interaction.
In parallel with numerical expansion there was an
increasing call amongst the membership for other
services besides financial. Although the diocese was
involved in education and health, integration of
development activities was still at an embryonic
stage by 1974-75. Gradually the actions of the
departments in the diocese gravitated towards each
other to provide a more coherent approach to the
DDS programme as a whole (see McNamara and
Morse 1996, for examples).
Given the expansion and diversification of activities
it was quite clear that the increased requirement
could not be met by the CSN, and funding would
have to be sought from donors outside the country
Various donors were approached and finance was
secured, mostly on a rolling 3-year plan basis. Again
this challenged the initial notion of self-reliance and
was not entered into lightly However, this coin-
cided with a further and far stronger challenge to
sustainability which appeared in the mid-1970s -
the advent of a World Bank project in Igalaland.
The World Bank in Igalaland
The World Bank earmarked Igalaland for a major
agricultural development project in June 1974 and
the project, called the Ayangba Agricultural
Development Project or AADP (Ayangba being a
town in the geographical centre of Igalaland), began
in 1977. The AADP was to cost $30m. of which
$ 19m, would be spent outside Nigeria and local
costs would be met by the state and federal govern-
ments (World Bank 1977). As can be seen from
Figure 2, the five-year life-time of the AADP
(1977-82) coincided with the hike in oil prices
brought about by the OPEC embargo in the 1970s
(the 'oil boom'). Nigeria was quite literally awash
with money and to the Igala people the AADP pro-
vided another obvious manifestation of this new-
found wealth.
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Although the DDS and AADP were so unlike in
many respects, there were some interesting paral-
lels. For example, like DDS one of the first services
the AADP decided to provide was agricultural
credit, and AADP also wished to adapt traditional
institutions for this purpose, although this was pri-
marily as a means of minimising transaction costs.
Unlike DDS there was no savings element, and in
contrast to the DDS, the AADP organised the farmer
groups and handed out interest free loans in just a
few weeks. Understandably perhaps, given both the
wider Nigerian context of the time and the
approach of AADP, repayment became extremely
problematic and continued to be for the duration of
the project. Many of the loans issued were never
recovered.
DDS programmes continued to function during the
life-time of the AADP, and DDS collaborated with
the AADP in many activities particularly in agricul-
tural extension. To all intents and purposes, DDS
was absorbed into AADP, although it still retained
some independence, and effectively became an
organisation within an organisation. The rationale
behind the decision to join with AADP may appear
paradoxical, but it was felt that, given the obvious
size and influence of AADP, it was the only way of
ensuring that the DDS philosophy could be main-
tained. Nevertheless, the AADP did have many neg-
ative effects on the FS services offered by DDS, a
fact not surprising given that AADP was offering
interest-free credit as well as many other low-cost or
free services. The concept of self-reliance was out-
of-date, and the number of FCs dwindled from 800
in 1977, just prior to the AADP, to 250 in 1982.
Although given an extension, the AADP effectively
ceased to exist in the mid-1980s. By 1982-83,
when it was obvious that the DDS/AADP partner-
ship was coming to a close, DDS began to consider
what its new role, if any, should be. However,
unlike in the early 1970s the Igala people no longer
wished to entertain the principle of self-help.
Nevertheless, during the early 1980s oil prices
began to fall rapidly and the economy worsened.
The concept of self-reliance, though unpopular,
would have to be revived. The years 1987-88 in
particular saw the beginning of hard times as many
people lost their jobs due to the onset of SAP in
1986. Government and other salaries were not paid
on time and did not match the galloping inflation
Figure 2: The Price (dollars/barrel) of Oil from the Arabian Oil Field (solid line) and from
Nigeria (dashed line) betwen 1972 and 1995. The horizontal bar represents the time
period of the Ayangba Agricultural Development Project (AADP).
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rates. Given these social pressures, it is not surpris-
ing that the numbers of deserted wives, widows and
handicapped also increased. DDS was one of the
few organisations in Igalaland with any form of
material resources that could be extended to people
in need.
Agriculture remained a major thrust of DDS in the
1980s and 1990s, and the FC savings/credit scheme
enjoyed a repayment rate of 95 per cent throughout
that period. There have been numerous adaptations
since the mid-1980s to accommodate the plight of
women and poorer groups. Indeed, by 1996 DDS
offered a very diverse range of FS, all credit-based
with no compulsory savings component, although
many recipients voluntarily started savings with
DDS. Over 400 small-scale projects were initiated
during 1988-93, and another 240 during 1993-96.
They included many off-farm activities, for example
milling and food processing aimed primarily at
women. The new FS offered by DDS are, however,
far less sustainable in financial terms than the FC
project.
3 Donors And Sustainability
In the early days of the FC project, donors in gen-
eral were very keen on the DDS approach to devel-
opment, and one donor in particular was very
supportive and provided funds for the FC project
and, on a smaller scale, for provision of loans for
grinding mills and women's activities. These funds
also covered salaries and some administrative costs
not covered by the local contribution. Although
there was a decline in membership and participa-
tion in the FC project during and immediately after
the AADP, relationships with donors continued to
be one of partnership. Unfortunately and ironically
when the oil boom waned and AADP collapsed it
became much more difficult to obtain funds from
donors, as it took a number of years for them to
realise how bad the situation had become.
Nevertheless, DDS continued where it hadfinished
prior to the onset of AADP and membership began
to expand again. Self-reliance was slowly coming
back onto the agenda.
However, just as the transition and upheaval were
taking place, DDS was dealt a severe, almost fatal,
blow by one of its donors. In the mid to late 1980s
this donor changed its approach and began to set
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out clearly what DDS should be doing and how it
had to be done. The FC project and other develop-
ment activities were to become entirely self-sustain-
ing, and this change was expected to be achieved
almost instantaneously (within a year or two).
There was simply no scope for discussion or com-
promise. What dynamic produced this abrupt
change in direction was never entirely clear,
although there were significant changes in person-
nel within the donor organisation at that time and
sustainability in FS provision was beginning to
achieve some prominence in development circles.
For example, a United Nations Symposium held in
1984 which focused on the mobilisation of savings
has been seen as a watershed in FS provision as part
of development (Seibel 1989). Whatever the cata-
lyst, the attraction of sustainability from the per-
spective of a donor is not difficult to appreciate.
Unfortunately the severe pressure to achieve com-
plete sustainability coincided with the worsening
conditions resulting from SAP, and the rapid
achievement of complete sustainability would have
meant a substantial increase in lending rates in par-
allel with measures to ensure loan recovery Even
worse, given the limited resources of DDS this
would inevitably have led to a withdrawal from all
other areas of development activity, including wel-
fare and on-farm research, so as to concentrate on
FS. Although the donor never emphasised that this
should be the case, the cost of embarking on the
path of complete sustainability would have led to
reduced emphasis on other elements of the poverty
alleviation strategy DDS was not willing to do this,
and fortunately other funders, not so preoccupied
with sustainability, were willing to help. Even so,
given the historical importance of the donor to DDS
the position was very precarious for a number of
years, and DDS came very close to total collapse.
Indeed since that time DDS has been very careful to
avoid a single donor becoming so dominant in its
affairs, and has successfully undertaken a policy of
diversification.
There was much irony in the donor pressure for
DDS to achieve complete sustainability in its FS, in
that it actually coincided with a more long-term
trend towards sustainability in the FC project! It
should be remembered that the FS scheme is
founded upon an indigenous institution - the oja -
with the result that the scheme is largely maintained
Table 2: Values of the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) for DDS along with some well-
known Rural Finance Institutions (based on data provided in Yaron (1992)).
by the farmers themselves. There are other costs, of
course, but by and large DDS is able to keep these
to a minimum. There is no need for expensive
regional offices or centres, and, as the scheme is
based on indigenous knowledge, then finding per-
sonnel to help manage it is easy and these do not
need to be highly trained or even educated beyond
primary level. As a result the sustainability of the FS
project has largely been determined by two simple
factors: the number of members (more members
means more income with little extra cost) and the
DDS interest rate for credit (all interest earned on
savings is passed on to the farmers except for a
small handling charge levied by DDS for each pass-
book). Except for the basic rule that failure to repay
a loan disqualifies a group from collecting a further
loan, DDS has never operated any form of screening
and in only one or two cases has it had to resort to
the courts for loan repayment. Peer pressure has
been extremely successful in avoiding such extreme
and unpleasant measures.
An illustration of the sustainability of the DDS FS
project and how it relates to trends in membership
is shown in Table 2. It also gives the values of the
SDI (Yaron 1992) for a number of well-known insti-
tutions providing FS as well as some estimated val-
ues for DDS (calculation, assumptions and raw data
for DDS are presented in McNamara and Morse
1998). As can be seen in Table 2 a number of 'suc-
cessful organisations had SDIs well above zero for a
number of 'snapshot' years indicating that they still
required subsidies. The SDI for DDS was very high
(89 per cent) during the time of AADP in the early
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1980s, confirming that the organisation was far
from self-sufficient. In 1982 the interest rate
charged by DDS would have had to be increased
from 12 to 23 per cent for it to eliminate subsidies.
However, by 1987 the SDI dropped to 20 percent,
a figure that compares well with the FS institutions
in Table 2. The reason for the decline was partly an
increase in operational efficiency (mostly because of
fewer staff and the introduction of computerisation)
and also a rapid increase in the number of FCs and
loans issued between 1982 and 1987. With only
250 FCs operatidnal in 1982 it was almost impossi-
ble to earn any sizeable income with lending rates
as low as 12 per cent. By 1996, when DDS had
recovered from the trauma imposed by the donor,
the SDI declined further to 11 per cent, due to
another increase in FCs and a higher interest rate
(24 per cent).
Given its performance in terms of sustainability it
can hardly be said, therefore, that DDS was oblivi-
ous to its responsibilities towards those providing
resources. Although never fully sustainable, DDS
did make great strides in that direction, and the
problem was never with the desirability of the ulti-
mate goal per se, but in the time scale and other
operational conditions that the donor wished to
impose. Indeed, the notion of making an interven-
tion as sustainable as possible was the motivating
force behind the initial discussions with Igala farm-
ers in the early 1970s that led to the adoption of the
ojo system for FS! DDS always felt that it was doing
the best it could under the prevailing circum-
stances, while helping to tackle poverty alleviation
Institution Country Year SD! (%)
Badan Kredit Kacamatan (BKK) Indonesia 1987 24
1989 20
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa (BUD) Indonesia 1987 3
1989 8
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives Thailand 1986 28
(BAAC) 1988 23
1987 180
Grameen Bank (GB) Bangladesh 1989 130
1982 89
Diocesan Development Services (DDS) Nigeria 1987 20
1996 11
Table 3: Summary of the Responses made to three Questions asked in a 1996 Survey
intended to determine the Relative Popularity of some of the Services offered by DDS (the
total number of respondents was 149).
on a broad front, and sacrifice of the latter was
never countenanced.
In all this discussion the central question is that
irrespective of the rights and wrongs of specific
pressures imposed by donors, do they have the
right to decide what is best for a field-based NGO
while they reside many thousands of miles away
and far removed from the local context within
which the field partner is operating? 'While Schmidt
and Zeitinger (1996) are perfectly correct in their
comments regarding the rights of donors to get
involved in the internal affairs of N GOs, a line must
be drawn between 'participation' and 'control'.
NGOs ought to have the greatest respect for the
intentions of their benefactors who provide funds to
donors, who in turn diligently ensure efficient and
effective usage. Donors are, of course, perfectly enti-
tled to have a vision of what they would like, but
only those in situ really know the difficulties and
limitations inherent in each situation. The DDS
experience with its major donor during the mid- to
late 1980s was very sobering and frustrating, espe-
cially as DDS tried continuously to communicate
the limitations over the preceding decade. Current
dogma appeared to be the driving force, taking
precedence over all that had been written and dis-
cussed. The ideal situation which DDS would pre-
fer is one with open, frank and genuine (not 'lip
service') dialogue with beneficiaries and donors
alike. This would nurture that atmosphere of trust,
understanding and care required for development
to succeed.
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4 Financial Services - A Need For
Sustainability or Integration?
The loans allocated within the FC project and other
FS schemes are relatively small, and DDS is satisfied
that they will not cause dependency. Only a rela-
tively small proportion of members' resources are
saved in FC accounts, and members have resources
tied to easily liquefied assets such as livestock, as
well as having contributions in a number of other
ojas. The DDS account is treated as but one of a
diverse range of investments. Given this, a reason-
able question might be why has the DDS F5 been so
popular? The results of a survey (Tables 3 and 4)
broadly confirmed that FC members have always
seen the FS offered by DDS as but one component
of a much larger service. Also important are agri-
cultural advice, awareness on pertinent matters
such as AIDS, TB and the handicapped, supply of
inputs (especially planting material) and the provi-
sion of water. Quite clearly, it is essential that FS be
viewed in the overall context of services offered.
Indeed it is noticeable that the three top ranking
services in Table 4 are basically the provision of
information, although experience has shown that
new members tend to be attracted primarily by the
ES element, and only later appreciate the other
benefits.
Given this experience the drive towards providing
financial services and nothing else has understand-
ably been viewed with some suspicion by DDS.
Table 4, for example, clearly illustrates that it would
be less effective for DDS to exist solely as a provider
of FS without also providing an information supply
facility Physical separation of the FS provision from
other services is also an unattractive option because
Question % of respondents
Would you like to be a member of DDS if both the savings and the loan schemes
were cancelled?
Would you like to be a member of DDS if the savings scheme was cancelled but
the loans remained?
Would you like to be a member of DDS if the loan scheme was cancelled but the
savings remained?
Yes
75
82
94
No
25
18
6
Table 4: The Results of a 1996 Survey to determine the Relative Popularity of some of
the Services offered by DDS.
The survey was conducted amongst DDS members only (number of respondents = 149). Respondents were asked to rank the
popularity of the service from 1 to 9, with 9 being the least popular. The results were analysed using a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
rank test (two-sided).
* P<O.05
** p<o.o1
P<o.001
An empty space indicates the absence of any statistical difference at the 5% probability level
of the experience with 'compartmentalisation' dur-
ing the AADP
NGOs that dare argue against sustainability in FS
have often been accused of wanting to hide their
inefficiency (Tendler 1989). However, given the
experience of DDS, the warnings of Dichter (1996),
loo
Brown (1997) and others, of the unforgiving drive
towards sustainability at any cost, resonate very
strongly. The DDS case calls into question the cur-
rent thinking in micro-finance circles about the
efficacy of pursuing a path of financial sustainabil-
ity divorced from the social, economic and political
context within which the local organisation works.
Social
aspect
Water
supply
Loans Supply
of agri-
cultural
inputs
Savings Supply
of plant-
ing
material
Advice
on agri-
culture
Sharing
of ideas
Advice
on other
prob-
lems
Socialaspect * *** *** *** *** *** ***
Water supply * ** ** *** ***
Loans *** ***
Supply of agricultural inputs * * * *
Savings
Supply of planting material * * * * *
Advice on agricultural
problems
* * * * *
Sharing of ideas
Advice on other problems
Median score 8 7 5 5 5 5 4 4 3
Average score 6.49 5.57 5.12 5.03 5.02 4.96 4.76 4.07 3.9
Variation in scores 2.54 3.11 2.41 2.17 2.39 1.87 2.17 2.74 2.81
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